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ABSTRACT 
 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are some the poorest and least developed in the 
world, with deplorable health and education levels. One way intended to promote better 
living standards has been through development aid. This study examines the determinants 
of multilateral aid inflows to sub-Saharan Africa to determine whether it is directed to the 
least developed countries. I use panel data about 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 
the 1995-2004 period to estimate a regression model in which I treat multilateral aid 
inflows as a proportion of GDP as the dependent variable, and proxies for health levels, 
education and institutional quality as explanatory variables. My analysis yields some 
evidence, especially in panel regressions with time-fixed effects, in support of the 
hypothesis that countries with poorer health and education levels receive more 
multilateral aid as a proportion of their gross domestic products. The corruption level, as 
measured by the International Country Risk Guide, however, appears to be an 
unimportant factor in the allocation of multilateral ODA. 
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I.  Introduction 
 Sub-Saharan Africa is home to some of the poorest and least developed countries 
in the world. According to the 2006 edition of the United Nations‟ annual Human 
Development Index (HDI), only three of the world‟s 38 least developed countries lay 
outside of this wretched region. The average HDI score of sub-Saharan countries was 
0.472, well below the world average of 0.741 and pitiful in comparison with the OECD 
average of 0.923 and Norway‟s top score of 0.965.1 Poor living standards, illiteracy, 
malnutrition and widespread disease are too often the norm south of the Sahara. Clearly, 
encouraging development in this region is a task of utmost importance and great urgency. 
 One way intended to promote better living standards has been through 
development aid. In most scholarly and policy discussions, the terms aid, development 
aid and foreign aid refer to Official Development Assistance (ODA), data about which 
are collected and published by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD. According to the Committee‟s criteria, financial assistance is classified under 
ODA if it is disbursed by official agencies, has the promotion of economic development 
and welfare as its main objective, and involves grants or concessional loans
2
 with at least 
a 25 percent grant element (Cassen et al., 1994). Based on the identity of the immediate 
donor, ODA can be classified as bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral assistance is 
administered by agencies of donor governments, whereas multilateral aid is funded by 
wealthy countries and allocated by international financial institutions, such as the World 
                                                 
1
 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures countries‟ development 
achievements based on the inhabitants‟ life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate, the combined gross 
enrollment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools, and GDP per capita measured in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) US dollars. The maximum score attainable is 1. (Source: United Nations Development 
Programme, Human Development Index 2006.) 
2
 Concessional loans offer more generous terms than those obtainable on the world‟s capital markets. See 
Cassen et.al: Does Aid Work?, p.2 for a brief, yet insightful, discussion. 
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Bank, the Regional Banks, or the United Nations Development Programme. About a third 
of all ODA inflows are multilateral.
3
   
 If multilateral aid is effective in promoting human development, it is crucial that it 
be allocated to the countries which need it most. This study examines the determinants of 
multilateral aid inflows in sub-Saharan Africa to determine whether it is directed to the 
least developed countries – those with the worst health and education levels. 
I apply a multiple regression on panel data from the 1995-2004 time period to 
tease out the importance of individual factors on the provision of multilateral aid to sub-
Saharan countries. In particular, I examine the effects of education and health levels, 
along with institutional quality and population size, on the amount of total multilateral 
ODA inflows as a proportion of GDP into 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I use adult 
literacy rates, extrapolated from a UNESCO data set, as proxies for education levels; life 
expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate, as given by the World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators, as a proxies for health levels; and the International Country Risk 
Guide measure of corruption within the political system as a proxy for institutional 
quality.  
I hypothesize that, if multilateral aid is directed to the least developed countries, 
lower inflows of multilateral ODA as a proportion of total GDP will be associated with 
higher adult literacy rates, a longer life expectancy at birth, and with lower infant 
mortality rates. Given many multilateral agencies‟ increased focus on fighting corruption 
and on the implementation of good policies, one would expect a negative association 
between higher corruption levels and the amount of aid received. The population 
                                                 
3
 Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why. A World Bank Policy Research Report. Oxford 
University Press, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 1998. Box 1: 
Defining Aid, p. 6 
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explanatory variable controls for possible bias towards less populous countries, which has 
been documented by some aid allocation studies. 
My analysis yields some evidence, especially in time-fixed effects regressions, 
supportive of the hypothesis that countries with poorer health and education levels 
receive more multilateral aid as a proportion of their gross domestic products. The 
corruption level, as estimated by the International Country Risk Guide, on the other hand, 
appears to have a statistically insignificant effect on the allocation of multilateral ODA. 
In this paper, I will first examine the relevant economic studies in the Literature 
Review section to provide background information about my study, and to put my 
contribution into the context of other research that has already been undertaken. After 
describing my variables and their origins in the Data Sources section, I will then, in the 
Methodology section, introduce and briefly discuss my regression model. Afterwords, I 
will run the regressions, discuss the results, and point out the shortcomings of my 
analysis in the Results section. Finally, in the concluding section, I will summarize my 
findings and point out possible directions for future research. 
II. Literature Review 
 We can classify economic research papers about foreign aid into two broad 
categories – those that deal with the question of aid effectiveness, and those that examine 
its allocation. Although this paper makes a contribution to the aid allocation literature, it 
will be enlightening to review literature on aid effectiveness first, as the question of 
effectiveness is crucial for deciding what kind of aid, and how much of it, should be 
allocated to individual recipients. 
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 The effectiveness of foreign aid is the subject of much debate in development 
economics. Some economists argue that aid does not significantly increase economic 
growth rates or improve human development indicators (e.g., Boone, 1996). Others, on 
the contrary, believe it does, especially when the recipient country implements 
appropriate policies (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Still others would argue, for 
example, that the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid are markedly different – while 
one type may promote growth and development, the other one may not (Ram, 2003; 
Cassen, 1994; Sender, 1999). 
 In a study of ODA data from 1971 to 1990, Boone (1996) found that most foreign 
aid had no significant impact on basic development measures such as infant mortality or 
primary schooling ratios, although some particular programs (immunization and research, 
for instance) could be effective. His results imply that most foreign aid is consumed 
rather than invested, and that aid receipts increase the size of the government without 
influencing health indicators. These discouraging findings constitute, in Boone‟s opinion, 
strong evidence of government failure, whose incentives to improve human development 
indicators are insufficient, aid inflows notwithstanding. 
In a widely cited study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid has a positive 
impact on economic growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies, but is rather ineffective when policies are poor. They interpret foreign aid as an 
income transfer, which can be invested to produce growth, or dissipated in unproductive 
government expenditure. Their findings indicate that one way to increase the 
effectiveness of aid would be to make it more systematically conditional on the quality of 
the recipient countries‟ policies. 
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Ram (2003) criticizes their methodology and argues against constraining the 
regression coefficients of bilateral and multilateral aid to be equal, as Burnside and Dollar 
have done. He finds that, if the coefficients for the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid 
on economic growth rates are separate and unconstrained, the estimated parameters 
change significantly. The bilateral aid parameters are estimated to be positive, whereas 
the estimated effect of an increase in multilateral aid is negative. Both parameters are 
sizeable, suggesting that there is a dramatic difference between the effects of the two aid 
components on growth rates.  These unequal effects of bilateral and multilateral 
development assistance could not have been picked up by Burnside and Dollar (2000), as 
their regression equation assumed that the effects of aid did not differ across the two 
categories. 
Ram suggests that the positive effects of bilateral aid on growth derive from a 
better understanding by the donors of the recipients‟ needs. He refers to Cassen (1994) 
who argues that specific technical skills, linguistic and personal affinities, similar 
institutional structures, long-standing commercial interaction, and the ability to render 
appropriate technical assistance make bilateral donors particularly well-placed to assist 
developing countries.  
The negative growth effects of multilateral aid may, according to Ram, derive 
from overly stringent „structural adjustment‟ requirements imposed by multilateral 
agencies. Sender (1999), for example, argues that the free-market policies prescribed by 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, both of which advocated a minimalist 
and non-interventionist role for the state, were too demanding in requiring that “these 
same ineffectual states should attempt a range of other complex tasks, including the 
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immediate and simultaneous implementation of fiscal discipline, financial deepening, 
privatization, good governance, democratization, and the liberalization of capital flows.” 
Ram‟s findings thus suggest that these agencies would be well-advised to review the 
conditions under which they award aid. 
In addition to possible disparities in effectiveness, there are differences in donors‟ 
motivations. A large body of economic research indicates that bilateral aid is more likely 
to be influenced by the donors‟ self-interest considerations than multilateral assistance. 
Ruttan (1989) notes that, according to economic self-interest arguments, bilateral aid 
promotes exports from and employment in the donor country. From a political or 
strategic point of view, foreign aid can, Ruttan points out, strengthen the political 
commitment of the recipient country to the donor. Maizels and Nissanke (1984)  analyzed 
aid flows from DAC donors during the 1969-70 and 1978-80 time periods, and found that 
the recipient need model, in which aid is granted to compensate for a shortfall in the 
recipient‟s domestic resources, provides a reasonable explanation for the distribution of 
multilateral aid but fails to explain bilateral aid inflows. Bilateral aid allocation is, 
according to their study, better explained by the donor interest model, in which countries 
provide assistance to safeguard their trade, investment, political and security interests.  
Alesina and Dollar (2000) focus on bilateral aid flows and conclude, as Maizels 
and Nissanke (1984) would predict, that the pattern of aid giving is, to a significant extent, 
influenced by political and strategic considerations. “An inefficient, economically closed, 
mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, 
receives more foreign aid than another country with a similar level of poverty, a superior 
policy stance, but without a past as a colony,” they contend. 
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Many other researchers have explored the allocation of development aid in a 
variety of econometric studies. Ridell (1999), for example, notes that although, in recent 
years, donors have given high priority to using aid to solve Africa‟s poverty problems, it 
seems that the amount of aid provided does not reflect the continent‟s needs and that the 
gap between aid needs and aid provided is widening. Large gaps remain, Ridell argues, 
between the donors‟ proclaimed support for poverty reduction and actual sectoral aid 
allocations. 
Wall (1995) finds that total net ODA allocations per capita are negatively 
correlated with per capita income but are not correlated with either infant mortality or 
political and civil rights. In their recent working paper, Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006) 
look at aid allocation during the post-Cold War era. They find that aid has been 
negatively related to per capita income and positively related to infant mortality, political 
and civil rights, and government effectiveness. Neither of these studies, however, draws a 
distinction between bilateral and multilateral aid allocation. I have tried to correct for this 
deficiency in my study, which focuses exclusively on the allocation of multilateral ODA. 
Rather than using a per capita measure, as Wall (1995) does, I have followed the 
methodology used by Burnside and Dollar (2000), and looked at multilateral aid as a 
proportion of gross domestic product. 
Turning to institutional quality, Alesina and Weder (2002) find no evidence that 
the level of corruption in a country, as measured by the International Country Risk Guide, 
reduced receipts of bilateral or multilateral aid during the 1974-1994 period or more 
recent subperiods. They also examined the impact of aid receipts on corruption levels, 
and tentatively found that an increase in aid led to more corruption. This result is 
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consistent with the „voracity effect‟ hypothesis proposed by Tornell and Lane (1999), 
according to which “the receipt of foreign aid induces powerful groups to increase 
appropriation rates, leading to a dissipation of the revenues and no gain in welfare.” 
This study contributes to the literature on foreign aid allocation by examining the 
effects of several determinants, such as health, education and corruption levels, on the 
size of multilateral aid inflows as a proportion of the gross domestic product of sub-
Saharan countries. It can thus provide additional evidence in support of, or against, the 
results found by the aforementioned studies. 
I will now proceed to specify what variables I employ in my panel regression 
analysis, and from which sources I obtained their values. 
 
III. Data Sources 
 This study examines the effects of education and health levels, as well as of 
institutional quality and population size, on the amount of total multilateral Official 
Development Assistance received as a proportion of gross domestic product in 22 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The analysis focuses on the 1995-2004 time period for several reasons. First of all, 
for public policy purposes, it is more informative to look at recent data, as they offer an 
insight into what the current practices are, and a good starting point for policy 
recommendations. Secondly, this time period begins after the end of the Cold War and 
thus avoids the problems associated with foreign aid allocation for political and strategic 
purposes in a bipolar world.
4
 Finally, covering a relatively short time span of ten years 
                                                 
4
 Khadka (1997) provides an interesting case study of aid donor motivations before and after the Cold War 
in Nepal. Even though Nepal is not a country in sub-Saharan Africa, the study provides valuable insight 
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reduces the risk of encountering significant differences in the way relevant variables are 
measured. 
 Data on multilateral aid inflows (the Aid/GDP variable; see the regression 
function in the section on methodology) come from the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD. They are available from the “DAC 2a: Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) – Disbursements by recipient and type” dataset in the 
OECD‟s online statistical database (OECD.STAT), and are denominated in millions of 
constant 2004 US dollars. Amounts are adjusted for aggregate income by dividing the 
multilateral inflows by the country‟s GDP, as given by the World Bank.5 ODA datasets 
provided by the OECD have been widely used in academic studies, including Maizels 
and Nissanke (1984), Boone (1996), and Alesina and Weder (2002), among others. 
Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates (for the Health variable), 
population size (for the Population variable) are taken from the World Development 
Indicators, an online database of country statistics administered by the World Bank. 
Infant mortality rates concern newborns who die in their first year of life and are 
expressed in deaths per 1000 live births. If life expectancy or infant mortality figures are 
not available for a specific year, they are extrapolated from the available data.
6
  
Adult literacy rates (for the Education explanatory variable) were obtained using 
a dataset published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). The dataset included estimates and projections of adult 
                                                                                                                                                 
into the differences in foreign aid allocation policies pre- and post-Cold War. Much of Khadka‟s analysis 
can be applied to other developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. 
5
 More specifically, as given by the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators, an online database of 
country statistics. 
6
 Missing life expectancy and mortality rate figures for a specific year were extrapolated using a simple 
linear function (y=ax+b) which connected the two closest points for which data was available. The 
extrapolated figures correspond simply to the appropriate points on the resulting straight line. 
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illiteracy rates for population aged 15 years and above, classified by country and gender 
at five year intervals for the 1970-2015 time period. The relevant estimates for the time 
period my study examines were those for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Adult literacy 
rate were calculated simply by subtracting the given adult illiteracy rate from the full 
literacy rate of 100%. Figures for the years in between these three years were 
extrapolated using a simple linear approximation that connected points for which specific 
estimates were given.
7
  
Although extrapolation may allow one to estimate the values of variables, whose 
time series are incomplete, it should be used with caution, as it can create additional 
methodological problems. If the extrapolated estimates, for example, do not match the 
true values of a variable, extrapolation can be a source of bias or inconsistency in 
estimating the regression coefficients. Moreover, extrapolation can give rise to artificially 
high correlations between the values of a variable over time, which can reduce the 
usefulness of time-fixed effects panel regressions. 
I obtained figures for the Institutions variable from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) database, which provides extensive time series on country-specific risk 
indicators. According to Alesina and Weder (2000), the ICRG provides “the most 
frequently used measure of corruption in academic research,” and covers a larger number 
of countries than alternative indicators. The ICRG‟s description of the corruption variable 
states that it is “a measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to 
foreign investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the 
efficiency of government and businesses by enabling people to assume positions of 
                                                 
7
 In other words, for each country, I used two linear functions of the form y=ax+b to extrapolate literacy 
rates – one for the 1995-2000 period (extrapolating figures for years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999), and the 
other one for 2000-2005 (to extrapolate rates for 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004). 
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power through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the 
political process.”8 The variable is measured on a six point scale. A high score indicates a 
low level of corruption. 
TABLE 1 – CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MULTILATERAL AID AS A PROPORTION OF GDP AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
  
Explanatory Variable 
 
 
Time period 
 
 
Life 
Expectancy 
 
Mortality Rate 
 
Literacy Rate 
 
Absence of 
Corruption 
 
Population Size  
 
1995 
 
 
-0.4147 
 
0.1602 
 
0.1032 
 
0.0066 
 
-0.2093 
 
2004 
 
 
-0.1192 
 
0.5565 
 
-0.3287 
 
-0.0045 
 
-0.3411 
 
10 year average 
(1995-2004) 
 
 
-0.4978 
 
0.0020 
 
-0.1778 
 
0.0816 
 
-0.3762 
Source: Multilateral aid amounts were obtained from OECD.STAT. Gross domestic product, life expectancy and 
population size figures, as well as mortality rates, were taken from the World Banks‟s World Development Indicators. 
Literacy rates were obtained from a UNESCO dataset. The absence of corruption variable comes from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
 
A naïve look at basic statistics provides some preliminary indications of a small-
country population bias and of a tendency to allocate more aid to countries with high life 
expectancies and a low mortality rate. Table 1, above, provides correlations between the 
multilateral aid as a proportion of GDP variable and the explanatory variables for the 
years 1995 and 2004, as well as for the 1995-2004 ten-year averages, as listed in Table 
B.1 in Appendix B. These basic correlations suggest that multilateral ODA per GDP has a 
moderately strong negative correlation with population size (ρ1995 = -0.2093; ρ2004 = -
0.3411; ρAVG = -0.3762), a sizeable negative correlation with life expectancy (ρ1995 = -
0.4147; ρ2004 = -0.1192; ρAVG = -0.4978), and a positive, albeit variable, correlation with 
the mortality rate (ρ1995 = 0.1602; ρ2004 = 0.5565; ρAVG = 0.0020). The correlations of 
multilateral aid as a proportion of GDP with the absence of corruption indicator and with 
                                                 
8
 International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database, online, accessed through the Princeton University 
Library 
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literacy rates change signs across the three time periods examined. The correlations with 
the absence of corruption variable, furthermore, are too weak to be suggestive.  
One should keep in mind, however, that each of these correlations may be 
affected by the other determinants and that a more sophisticated regression analysis needs 
to be undertaken to estimate the hypothesized effects. 
So far. I have described the character, origins and units of the dependent and 
independent variables used in my study. I have also pointed out some limitations to their 
use, especially those derived from the use of extrapolated estimates where exact values 
are unavailable. In the next section, I explain the methodological framework in which 
these variables will be put to use. I shall specify my panel regression function, discuss the 
importance of country- and time-fixed effects, and present my research hypothesis. 
 
IV. Methodology 
 In this study, I use panel data about 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, listed in 
Appendix A, from the 1995-2004 period to estimate a regression model in which I treat 
multilateral aid inflows as a proportion of GDP as the dependent variable, and proxies
9
 
for health levels, education and institutional quality as explanatory variables. The 
explanatory variables represent hypothesized determinants of the allocation of 
multilateral aid. Because the aim of my analysis is to estimate the effect of these 
determinants on the amount of multilateral ODA received by countries, adjusted for 
aggregate income, in sub-Saharan Africa, I use the following regression equation: 
 
                                                 
9
 A proxy variable is, according to Wooldridge (2003), an observed variable that is related but not identical 
to an unobserved explanatory variable in a multiple regression analysis. Using proxies is a way to 
overcome, or at least mitigate, the omitted variables bias. 
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Aid
 )ln()ln( 43210   
 
where the subscript i indexes countries, t indexes time (year in question) and e is the error 
term. The dependent variable Aid/GDP represents the amount of multilateral aid received 
by the country as a proportion of its gross domestic product. On the right-hand side of the 
equation, β0, β1, … , β4 are regression coefficients to be estimated. Health represents the 
inhabitants‟ health level and is proxied for by either their life expectancy or the country‟s 
infant mortality rate. Education is the country‟s inhabitants‟ education level as measured 
by the adult literacy rate, and Institutions stands for institutional quality, proxied for by a 
measure of corruption within the country‟s political system, whose high values indicate 
low prevalence of corrupt practices, and vice versa. Finally, the log of Population 
variable serves to control for a possible population bias. 
 Note that the dependent variable and one of the explanatory variables are in the 
logarithmic form. The proposed regression equation thus combines the features of log-
linear and log-log models. Coefficient β4 represents an elasticity
10
 - namely, the ratio of 
the percentage change in Aid/GDP to the percentage change in a country‟s population. 
Coefficients β1 , β2 and β3, on the other hand, measure the proportional change in Aid/GDP 
in response to a unit change in the Health, Education and Institutions variables, 
respectively. In particular, a unit change in, for instance, Education is associated with a 
100 × β2 percent change in Aid/GDP. 
                                                 
10
 Elasticity, in general, is a measure of the (proportional) responsiveness of the dependent variable to 
proportional changes in the independent variable. 
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 I will examine the role of country-fixed and time-fixed effects on the panel 
regression. Time-fixed effects are a way of accounting for the influence of global 
business cycles, as was done in Burnside and Dollar (2000), and for potential changes in 
the multilateral donors‟ inclination to provide aid. They are introduced by modifying the 
error term eit to include a time-specific intercept αt:  eit = αt + εit . Country-fixed effects 
can account for individual characteristics of the countries in the sample that could affect 
their receipts of multilateral aid, regardless of the values of the explanatory variables. 
These effects can be introduced into the error term eit through a country-specific intercept 
γi:  eit = γi + εit . In some regressions, I will include both time- and country-specific effects: 
eit = αt + γi + εit . In all of the above cases the time- and country-specific intercepts can be 
correlated with the explanatory variables, but the following has to hold: 
0])ln(,,,[ ititititit PopulationnsInstitutioEducationHealthE  for all i and t. 
 Life expectancy at birth and adult literacy rates certainly do not capture all aspects 
of what they proxy for - health and education levels, respectively. These statistics are 
used by the United Nations Development Programme in their calculations of the HDI 
index, and seem to provide reasonable approximations.
11
 Life expectancy figures are, 
furthermore, relatively easy to extrapolate for years in which data is not available. One 
drawback of using life expectancy data is that it tends to remain relatively stable over 
time and its coefficient can thus be difficult to estimate in a panel regression with time-
fixed effects. Because of this, a more volatile variable – in particular, the infant mortality 
rate - was introduced as an alternative proxy for health levels. 
                                                 
11
 Although, one should add, the HDI‟s education component also factors in combined gross enrollment 
ratios for primary, secondary and tertiary schools. 
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The motivating question underlying my research is whether multilateral aid is 
allocated to the countries which need it most – those with the worst health and education 
levels. If this is indeed the case, one would expect a longer life expectancy at birth and 
greater adult literacy rates to decrease the amount of aid received (β1 < 0; β2 < 0). 
Negative coefficients for β1 and β2 would be consistent with Maizels and Nissanke (1984) 
who claimed that the recipient need model explained multilateral aid allocation. If we 
used infant mortality rates instead of life expectancy as a proxy for health levels, we 
would expect coefficient β1 to be positive (β1  > 0), as higher mortality rates would be 
associated with more multilateral aid. 
In light of the multilateral agencies‟ increased focus on reducing corruption, one 
may expect more corrupt countries to receive less aid, other things equal (β3  > 0). Such a 
finding would be at odds with the results obtained by Alesina and Weder (2002), who 
found no evidence that higher corruption levels decreased the amount of aid received.  
Previous research indicates that there has been a bias in aid allocation towards 
less populous countries (β4  < 0). In their analysis of aid allocation, Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), for instance, find that population has a large negative coefficient, suggesting that 
aid goes disproportionately to smaller countries. 
There are, of course, limitations to the proposed methodology. Some of the 
variables, such as literacy rates and the corruption measure, are difficult to measure 
exactly. Furthermore, figures for some years are obtained by a linear extrapolation from 
the available data. The figures used in my study may thus not correspond to the true 
values, although they are likely to be reasonably close. In addition, the use of 
extrapolated estimates can lead to artificially high correlations between the values of 
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some variables over time. Especially in panel regressions with time-fixed effects, it could 
reduce the usefulness of coefficient estimates, due to multicollinearity. 
 Another shortcoming of my methodology concerns the possible endogeneity of 
explanatory variables.
12
 There may, for example, be a factor that is correlated with both 
multilateral aid receipts and one of the explanatory variables. Not including this factor in 
the regression could be a source of omitted variable bias. 
Furthermore, a reverse causality problem can arise in my regression analysis. 
Especially if aid is effective, it is conceivable that some of the explanatory variables are 
influenced by multilateral ODA inflows. For instance, to the extent that multilateral 
development aid receipts lead to an improvement in education levels, literacy rates may 
rise as a result. It may then be unclear whether higher literacy rates are a cause or a 
consequence of increased aid receipts. 
If Boone‟s (1996) finding that foreign aid does not significantly improve 
development indicators is correct, however, then we can rule out the potential causal 
effect on multilateral ODA inflows on the independent variables, and the reverse 
causality problem disappears. Burnide and Dollar‟s (2000) observation that good fiscal, 
monetary and trade policies are a prerequisite for aid effectiveness, would lead us to a 
similar conclusion, to the extent that countries in sub-Saharan Africa generally suffer 
from poor governance. Finally, Ram (2003) notes that multilateral aid receipts are 
negatively correlated with economic growth rates, which may also suggest that 
multilateral ODA is lacking in effectiveness – an observation which reduces the risk of 
reverse causality. 
                                                 
12
 Wooldridge (2003) defines an endogenous explanatory variable as one that is, for whatever reason, 
correlated with the error term. 
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V. Results 
I first ran six panel regressions – two with country-fixed, two with time-tixed 
effects and the last two with both - using the model outlined in the Methodology section.  
The resulting coefficient estimates and robust standard errors, as well as some 
additional statistics such as the number of observations and the adjusted R
2
 are 
summarized in Table 2 below: 
 
TABLE 2 – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (MULTILATERAL AID AS A PROPORTION OF GDP ) ) 
 
Independent variable 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
  Constant 
 
 
4.3863 
(21.7264) 
 
- 26.094 
(22.1595) 
 
17.673** 
(2.322) 
 
14.4197** 
(1.592) 
 
- 135.31**    
(60.527) 
 
-192.56**   
(68.741)     
Health: 
  
  Life expectancy 
 
 
 
0.09558** 
(0.02428) 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0.05296** 
(0.02196) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03567   
(0.0463) 
 
 
 
 
  Mortality rate 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0.00034** 
(0.00013) 
 
 
 
 
0.00356*  
(0.00213) 
 
 
 
 
- 0.00038**   
(0.00013) 
Education: 
 
  Literacy rate 
 
 
 
0.0043 
(0.03508) 
 
 
- 0.0505 
(0.0382) 
 
 
-0.0203**   
(0.0037) 
 
 
-0.01754**  
(0.0039) 
 
 
0.09055   
(0.0753) 
 
 
0.11558   
(0.0967) 
Institutional quality: 
 
   Absence of   
   Corruption 
 
 
- 0.1132 
(0.08699) 
 
0.04902 
(0.0714) 
 
0.01656 
(0.1439) 
 
- 0.03398* 
(0.1502) 
 
- 0.1832*  
(0.10255) 
 
- 0.01783*   
(0.10368) 
Population: 
 
  Log(Population) 
 
 
0.00212 
(1.4605) 
 
2.318 
(1.4756) 
 
-0.3114** 
(0.09399) 
 
- 0.29103** 
(0.0855) 
 
8.3631**  
(3.919) 
 
11.856**   
(4.108) 
 
Country-fixed effects 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Time-fixed effect 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 
Adjusted R2 0.8284 0.8032 0.1958 0.1879 0.8363 0.8353 
Notes: Asterisks indicate that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the *10% or at the **5% significance level. 
 
 The country-fixed effects regressions did not yield, with the only exception of the 
two Health variables, any statistically significant coefficients. The literacy rate and 
absence of corruption coefficients changed signs across the two regressions. The 
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estimated elasticity of Aid/GDP in response to a change in a country‟s population had a 
positive sign. This result would have indicated that the population bias towards less 
populous countries, demonstrated by studies such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), did not 
hold, but the estimate was, unfortunately, not statistically significant at either the 10 or 
the 5 percent level.  
The coefficients of Health variables, however, were both statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level, but did not have the expected signs. In regression (1), a one year 
increase in the average life expectancy lead to a 9.6 increase in Aid/GDP, while in 
regression (2), a 10 percent rise in the mortality rate was associated with a very minor, 
0.35 percent, increase in the amount of multilateral ODA received as a proportion of total 
GDP. In both regressions, the adjusted R
2
 values were in the vicinity of 0.815 for both 
country-fixed effects regressions, suggesting a fairly good fit. 
 The following two time-fixed effects panel regression yield some noteworthy 
results, which largely conform to my research hypothesis and where most of the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
In regression (3), an additional year of life expectancy is associated with a 5.3% 
decline in multilateral Aid/GDP receipts. A 10 percent rise in the literacy rate, moreover, 
leads to a 20.3% fall in Aid/GDP. Finally, a doubling of a country‟s population predicts a 
31% decrease in multilateral aid receipts as a proportion of national income. 
The results of regression (4) indicate that a 10 percent increase in the mortality 
rate leads to a 3.6% increase in Aid/GDP, and that a 10 percept rise in the literacy rate is 
associated with a 17.5% decrease in the receipt of multilateral aid as a proportion of GDP. 
If the population of a country doubles, Aid/GDP is expected to decrease by about 29%. 
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These results are, to a considerable extent, consistent with my hypothesis. 
Countries with poorer health and education levels seem, indeed, on average to receive 
less multilateral Official Development Assistance as a proportion of their gross domestic 
products. Furthermore, it appears that there is a fairly strong bias towards providing more 
aid to countries with smaller populations – a result that is in line with previous findings, 
such as those in Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
In the case of the Institutions proxy – the absence of corruption variable -, 
however, my hypothesis does not hold. Its coefficient changes signs across the two time-
fixed effects regressions. Furthermore, it is not statistically significant in regression (3) 
and only significant at the 10 percent level in regression (4). To the extent that such a 
result might indicate that multilateral donors do not factor the perceived level of 
corruption into their aid allocation decisions, these estimated coefficients could validate 
Alesina and Weder‟s (2002) findings that corruption does not reduce foreign aid receipts. 
Although the two time-fixed panel regressions yield statistically significant 
coefficients, their adjusted R
2
 is very low – only around 0.19. Such low values indicate 
that the panel regression overall does not fit the sample data well, and that other factors – 
perhaps country-specific qualities that remain constant across time – might be important. 
The results are, nevertheless, very telling. Without taking into account the 
presumably large influence of country-fixed effects, we find that the results of 
regressions (3) and (4) are supportive, on a statistically significant level, of the research 
hypothesis. 
The final two regressions summarized in Table 3 combine country- and time-
fixed effects. The only coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 
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both regressions (5) and (6) is the estimated elasticity of Aid/GDP in response to changes 
in Population. In regression (5), if a country‟s population doubled, Aid/GDP would rise 
eightfold, whereas in regression (6), the doubling of a country‟s population is associated 
with an eleven-fold increase. Not only do these coefficients not support the small-country 
bias hypothesis, the elasticity also seems unrealistically high. In regression (6), the 
mortality rate coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and indicates 
that a 10 percent increase in a country‟s mortality rate would lead to a very meager, 0.38 
percent, decrease in Aid/GDP. The life expectancy and literacy rate coefficients are not 
statistically significant in either equation, but they have the expected signs. The absence 
of corruption coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level in both regressions, and it 
indicates that a one point increase on the International Country Risk Guide scale would 
lead to an 18.3% decrease in Aid/GDP in regression (5), but only a 1.8% decline in 
regression (6). The combined country- and time-fixed effects regressions display a very 
good fit to the sample data, as their adjusted R
2 
statistics hover around 0.84. 
Across the six panel regressions discussed above, one coefficient that was often 
not statistically significant and tended to change signs is that of the absence of corruption 
variable. I have therefore decided to drop it from the regression model and to reestimate 
the model. As before, I ran six regressions with various combinations of country-fixed 
and time-fixed effects. The results are summarized in Table 4, which follows:  
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TABLE 3 – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS AFTER THE EXCLUSION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (MULTILATERAL AID AS A PROPORTION OF GDP ) ) 
 
Independent 
variable 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
  Constant 
 
 
- 11.344 
(20.278) 
 
- 19.54 
(20.124) 
 
17.758**   
(2.2359) 
 
14.204** 
(1.116) 
 
 
- 136.599**   
(64.0597) 
 
- 188.694**   
(78.884) 
Health: 
  
  Life expectancy 
 
 
 
0.0872**  
(0.0231) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0.0526**   
(0.0214) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03241   
(0.0524) 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mortality rate 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0.00035**   
(0.00012) 
 
 
 
 
0.00358**   
(0.00213) 
 
 
 
 
- 0.000353**   
(0.000125) 
Education: 
 
  Literacy rate 
 
 
 
- 0.0102 
(0.0346) 
 
 
- 0.0455  
(0.0372)   
 
 
- 0.02011**   
(0.004) 
 
 
- 0.0179**   
(0.00419) 
 
 
0.05376 
(0.0795) 
 
 
0.0774 
(0.1005) 
Population: 
 
  Log(Population) 
 
 
 
1.0244   
(1.365) 
 
 
1.90677   
(1.3537) 
 
 
- 0.3158**   
(0.0883) 
 
 
 
- 0.2815**   
(0.0699) 
 
 
8.5672* 
(4.1298) 
 
 
11.742** 
(4.709) 
 
Country-fixed effects 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Time-fixed effect 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 
Adjusted R2 0.8277 0.8039 0.1997 0.1916 0.8333 0.8324 
    Notes: Asterisks indicate that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the *10% or  
                at the **5% significance level. 
 
Regressions (1) and (2) include only country-fixed effects. Only the Health 
variable coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Their signs, 
however, do not conform to my research hypothesis. In regression (1) a one year rise in 
average life expectancy is associated with an 8.7% increase in Aid/GDP. A ten percent 
rise in the mortality rate is associated, in regression (2), with an 0.35% decrease in the 
amount of multilateral aid received in proportion to GDP. The literacy rate coefficients 
are not statistically significant but have the hypothesized sign. If a country‟s literacy rate 
increased by 10 percent, Aid/GDP would go down by 10.2% or a much more significant 
45.5%, in regressions (1) and (2) respectively.  The estimates of Aid/GDP‟s elasticity 
with respect to a country‟s population, while not statistically significant, have a positive 
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sign, indicating that populous countries tend to receive more multilateral ODA as a 
proportion of their national income. This is at odds with Burnside and Dollar‟s (2000) 
finding of a small-country population bias. The adjusted R
2
 is around 0.81 for both 
regressions, suggesting a good fit. 
The following two time-fixed effects panel regressions (3) and (4) are remarkable 
because all of their coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The results, furthermore, correspond quite closely to the research hypothesis: Countries 
with worse health and education levels tend to receive more Aid/GDP. Furthermore, there 
are also indications of a population bias in favor of less populous countries. In regression 
(3), an additional year of average life expectancy lead to a 5.3 percent decrease in 
Aid/GDP, and a ten percent rise in the literacy rate yields a 20.1 percent fall in 
multilateral aid as a proportion of the gross domestic product. If a country‟s population 
doubled, it would receive 31.6 percent less Aid/GDP. In regression (4), a ten percent rise 
in the mortality rate leads to a 3.6% fall in multilateral ODA received as a proportion of 
GDP, and a ten percent rise in the adult literacy rate is associated with a 17.9% fall in 
Aid/GDP. The doubling of a country‟s population would decrease Aid/GDP by about 
28.2 percent. The overall fit of the time-fixed effects regressions is very poor. The 
adjusted R
2
 only reaches about 0.195. That, however, does not mean that the results are 
not important. Most likely, the low fit of the regression indicates that country-fixed 
effects, not included in these regressions, explain a great deal of the sample variance. Still, 
we can conclude that, without accounting for the large country-fixed effects, the time-
fixed effects panel regressions yield statistically significant results, which are, for the 
most part, consistent with the research hypothesis.  
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Regressions (5) and (6) combine country- and time-fixed effects. Estimates of the 
population elasticity of Aid/GDP are statistically significant at the 10 or 5 percent level in 
both equations, and they indicate a rather implausibly large multilateral aid allocation 
bias in favor of countries with large populations. In regression (5), the doubling of a 
country‟s population would lead to a 8.5-fold increase in Aid/GDP, and in regression (6), 
the increase would be almost 12-fold. Needless to say, these findings are not consistent 
with Burnside and Dollar‟s (2000) observation that less populous countries receive, 
ceteris paribus, more foreign aid than more populous ones. Health variables do not have 
the expected signs, although only the mortality rate coefficient is statistically significant. 
Regression (5) suggests that, if the life expectancy of a country‟s inhabitants went up by 
one year, one would expect Aid/GDP to rise by 3.2 percent, whereas regression (6) 
indicates that a ten percent rise in the mortality rate is associated with a 0.35 percent 
decline in multilateral ODA receipts in proportion to GDP. The literacy rate coefficient, 
which in both cases has a sign opposite to that which was expected, is not statistically 
significant in either regression. According to regression (5), a ten point increase in the 
literacy rate would yield a 54 percent increase in Aid/GDP, whereas in regression (6), the 
increase would amount to as much as 77 percent. The combined country- and time-fixed 
effects regressions appear to explain a great deal of variation in the data, as the adjusted 
R
2
 is as high as approximately 0.83 for both. 
Overall, it appears that the panel regressions with both country- and time-fixed 
effects provide the best fit to the sample data. The estimated coefficients, however, were 
mostly not statistically significant and only rarely supported the research hypothesis. 
Regressions where only time-fixed effects were included yielded statistically significant 
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results that, by and large, conformed to the research hypothesis. The adjusted R
2 
statistic 
was, however, relatively low and indicated a rather poor fit without including country-
fixed effects.  
In light of these results, it seems appropriate to conclude that the analysis provides 
at least some evidence that confirms the research hypothesis. In other words, there is 
some evidence – especially in the time-fixed effects regressions - that, in sub-Saharan 
Africa, more multilateral Official Development Assistance as a proportion of GDP is 
allocated to countries with lower health and education levels.  Corruption, however, does 
not seem to be a significant factor in aid allocation decisions. The lack of clear-cut results 
and statistical significance in regressions that include country-fixed effects, can be 
attributed to the relatively low number of observations, given the multitude of regressors. 
These findings give some support to Maizels and Nissanke‟s (1984) conclusions, 
according to which the needs of the recipient country explained the amount of 
multilateral aid received. The apparent lack of importance of corruption prevalence in 
multilateral ODA allocation is consistent with Alesina and Weder (2002) who argued that 
corruption did not affect the amount of aid a country received. 
My analysis, however, has a number of shortcomings. The most obvious one is 
the potential for omitted variable bias. My regression equations included only a limited 
number of explanatory variables, and it is entirely possible that some factors correlated 
with the included variables have been left out, thus causing a correlation between the 
error term and the explanatory variables. Such omitted variables bias could be a possible 
source of bias and inconsistency in the estimated coefficients. The income level of a 
given country, for example, could be correlated with the other explanatory variables.  
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A country with a higher standard of living, as measured by the aggregate income 
proxy, could also have a lower mortality rate, a greater life expectancy, and a higher 
literacy rate. The coefficients for the current explanatory variables would then, at least to 
some extent, be picking up the effects of income variation across countries in addition to 
what they really are supposed to measure. The inclusion of an additional income 
explanatory variable based on the gross domestic product could, nevertheless, be 
problematic in its own right, since GDP is already included in the denominator of the 
dependent variable.  
Another issue that could arise in connection with my regression equations is the 
problem of reverse causality. Throughout my analysis, I have assumed that the variation 
in allocated multilateral ODA was caused by the differences in the explanatory variables. 
The causation could, however, plausibly run the other way. Some of the explanatory 
variables could be affected by aid receipts - especially if multilateral aid is effective in 
promoting economic and human development. An increase in received multilateral ODA 
could, in this scenario, improve the country‟s inhabitants‟ health levels, leading to lower 
mortality rates.  
Especially in regressions which include country-fixed effects, the number of 
observations is relatively small compared to the number of regressors. This leads to 
inconclusive results and a lack of statistical significance in some regressions. 
Finally, one should remember that the values of some variables, most notably the 
mortality rate, life expectancies and literacy rates, were not available for every year in the 
1985-2004 time period, and were extrapolated using a straight line approximation. To the 
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extent that the real values of these variables different from the extrapolated estimates, my 
regression coefficients may have exhibited some bias or inconsistency.  
VI. Conclusion 
 This panel study of 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa examined the effects of a 
number of determinants – health and education levels, institutional quality, and 
population size – on the amount of multilateral Official Development Assistance the 
countries received during the 1985-2004 time period. I tested the hypothesis that 
countries with lower health and education levels would receive more multilateral ODA as 
a proportion of their GDP. I also examine the role of corruption, used as a proxy for 
institutional quality, in allocating multilateral ODA. Given the increased attention that 
many multilateral agencies, most notably the World Bank, have been paying to the issues 
of governance in recent years, I expected higher corruption levels to be associated with 
lower receipts of multilateral aid. 
To the extent that multilateral aid is effective but possibly dissipated by corrupt 
institutions, - both contentions are a matter of much disagreement among development 
economists and their examination is beyond the scope of this paper -, such a result would 
indicate sensible allocation decisions on the part of multilateral agencies. 
 The regression results indicate that a model with both country- and time-fixed 
effects provides the best explanation, in terms of how good a fit the regressions provide, 
for the allocation of multilateral ODA. The estimated coefficients, however, are mostly 
not statistically significant and thus do not provide much useful information about the 
effect of specific factors on multilateral ODA allocation. In many cases, furthermore, 
they did not exhibit signs consistent with my research hypothesis. These inconclusive and 
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statistically insignificant results can be attributed to the relatively low number of 
observations, combined with a multitude of regressors. 
In regressions where only time-fixed effects were included, however, the obtained 
coefficients were statistically significant and had the expected sign, but the adjusted R
2 
statistic was too low for a reasonably good fit, indicating a large role for country-fixed 
effects. These results provide, without accounting for the extensive country-fixed effects, 
at least some empirical support for the research. 
 All in all, my analysis yields some evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
countries with poorer health and education levels receive more multilateral aid as a 
proportion of their gross domestic products. The corruption level, as measured by the 
International Country Risk Guide, however, appears to be an unimportant factor in the 
allocation of multilateral ODA. 
The shortcomings of my analysis include the low number of observations, the 
potential presence of omitted variable bias, issues of reverse causality, and the possible 
imprecision of coefficient estimates based on extrapolated values of explanatory variables. 
These imperfections represent, in my view, an opportunity for further research. One 
could, for example, try to obtain a greater number of observations as well as more 
accurate, rather than merely extrapolated, values of the explanatory variables, or include 
additional regressors to deal with omitted variable bias, and then redo the panel 
regression analysis to obtain more conclusive results. One could also undertake a more 
detailed study of the decision-making processes in the multilateral agencies themselves to 
ascertain whether multilateral ODA is allocated based on health and education variables, 
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or whether any correlations with these regressors are a by-product of some other decision 
rule. 
 
Appendix A 
List of the 22 countries used in the study: 
 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Cote d‟Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Uganda 
Zambia 
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Appendix B 
TABLE B.1 – TEN-YEAR AVERAGES FOR THE 1995-2004 TIME PERIOD     (part 1/2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Life 
Expectancy 
(years) 
 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
(deaths per 
1000 live births) 
 
Life 
Expectancy 
(years) 
Botswana 44.95 69.30 44.95 
Burkina Faso 46.80 101.35 46.80 
Cameroon 47.70 88.05 47.70 
Congo 51.50 81.00 51.50 
Congo DR 42.35 129.00 42.35 
Cote d'Ivoire 47.20 114.00 47.20 
Ethiopia 42.50 116.60 42.50 
Gambia 54.65 92.45 54.65 
Ghana 57.00 67.70 57.00 
Guinea Bissau 44.35 133.80 44.35 
Kenya 49.10 75.75 49.10 
Malawi 40.95 222.25 40.95 
Mali 47.60 125.35 47.60 
Mozambique 43.05 124.40 43.05 
Namibia 53.35 50.75 53.35 
Niger 43.55 162.35 43.55 
Nigeria 44.15 109.40 44.15 
Senegal 55.20 80.70 55.20 
South Africa 50.10 49.50 50.10 
Sudan 55.70 65.70 55.70 
Uganda 45.20 85.85 45.20 
Zambia 38.55 102.00 38.55 
         continued on next page 
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                            continued from previous page 
TABLE B.1 – TEN-YEAR AVERAGES FOR THE 1995-2004 TIME PERIOD     (part 2/2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Literacy 
Rate  
(%) 
 
Absence of 
Corruption 
(ICRG index) 
 
Population 
Size 
 
Multilateral 
ODA / GDP 
(mn, constant 
2004 USD) 
 
Botswana 76.66 3.00 2,459,766.27 2,119.16 
Burkina Faso 23.59 2.25 11,213,747.70 7,907.54 
Cameroon 70.50 2.25 14,691,635.00 7,169.93 
Congo 73.47 3.21 3,389,118.70 8,926.86 
Congo DR 60.70 1.10 49,933,094.00 7,957.17 
Cote d'Ivoire 43.07 2.66 16,450,020.20 9,540.18 
Ethiopia 38.67 2.00 63,443,014.00 10,571.47 
Gambia 36.10 3.13 1,295,764.40 16,468.23 
Ghana 69.68 2.55 19,672,487.40 9,312.21 
Guinea Bissau 37.91 2.00 1,354,540.60 44,547.89 
Kenya 81.68 2.21 30,344,799.60 6,408.27 
Malawi 59.68 2.72 11,345,694.00 35,536.30 
Mali 25.30 2.43 11,546,408.30 22,032.71 
Mozambique 81.63 2.88 17,694,947.10 25,860.71 
Namibia 81.63 2.93 1,854,863.20 5,005.41 
Niger 15.79 1.51 11,634,515.40 18,913.67 
Nigeria 63.08 1.35 116,261,930.00 1,490.55 
Senegal 36.96 2.85 10,231,006.60 14,815.84 
South Africa 85.01 3.44 43,036,512.40 329.95 
Sudan 56.92 1.18 32,496,055.80 2,059.47 
Uganda 66.36 2.15 24,109,492.20 13,441.09 
Zambia 77.53 2.61 10,561,399.50 48,854.05 
      Source: Life expectancy, infant mortality rate and life expectancy figures were taken from 
       the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators. 
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